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Abstract
Mathematical Theory of Evidence called also Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) is
known as a foundation for reasoning when knowledge is expressed at various levels
of detail. Though much research effort has been committed to this theory since its
foundation, many questions remain open. One of the most important open questions
seems to be the relationship between frequencies and the Mathematical Theory of
Evidence. The theory is blamed to leave frequencies outside (or aside of) its framework.
The seriousness of this accusation is obvious: (1) no experiment may be run to compare
the performance of DST-based models of real world processes against real world data,
(2) data may not serve as foundation for construction of an appropriate belief model.
In this paper we develop a frequentist interpretation of the DST bringing to fall
the above argument against DST. An immediate consequence of it is the possibility to
develop algorithms acquiring automatically DST belief models from data. We propose
three such algorithms for various classes of belief model structures: for tree structured
belief networks, for poly-tree belief networks and for general type belief networks.
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1 Introduction
The Dempster-Shafer Theory or the Mathematical Theory of Evidence (DST) [34], [6] shows
one of possible ways of application of mathematical probability for subjective evaluation and
is intended to be a generalization of bayesian theory of subjective probability. [37].
This theory offers a number of methodological advantages like: capability of representing
ignorance in a simple and direct way, compatibility with the classical probability theory,
compatibility of boolean logic and feasible computational complexity [33].
DST may be applied for (1) representation of incomplete knowledge, (2) belief updating,
(3) and for combination of evidence [30].DST covers the statistics of random sets and may
be applied for representation of incomplete statistical knowledge. Random set statistics is
quite popular in analysis of opinion polls whenever partial indecisiveness of respondents is
allowed [7].
Practical applications of DST include: integration of knowledge from heterogeneous
sources for object identification [5], technical diagnosis under unreliable measuring devices
[8], medical applications: [12], [44]. Relationships betwenn DST network reliability compu-
tation have been investigated [29].
In spite of indicated merits, DST experienced sharp criticism from many sides. The
basic line of criticism is connected with the relationship between the belief function (the
basic concept of DST) and frequencies.
The problem of frequencies is not solely a scholar problem. It has significant knowl-
edge engineering (expressive power, sources of knowledge, knowledge acquisition strategies,
learning algorithms) and software engineering implications (internal representation, measure
transformation procedures). First of all one should realize that a computer-based advisory
system is rarely made for a single consultation. Hence we may (at least theoretically) ob-
tain a statistics of cases for which the system has been applied. Life verifies also frequently
enough the advices obtained from the advisory system. Hence after a long enough time one
may pose at least partially the question whether or not the advices have been correct. A
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belief function (the basic concept of DST) without a modest frequentist interpretation may
be treated as a void answer in this context.
Therefore numerous probabilistic interpretations have been attempted since the early
days of DST. Dempster [6] initiated interval interpretation of DST. a¸ Kyburg [23] showed
that the belief function may be represented by an envelop of a family of traditional probability
functions and claimed that the behaviour of combining evidence via belief functions may be
properly explained in statistics under proper independence assumptions. Hummel and Landy
[16] considered DST as a ”statistics of expert opinions” so that it ”contains nothing more
than Bayes’ formula applied to Boolean assertions, .... (and) tracks multiple opinion as
opposed to a single probabilistic assessment”.
Pearl [27] and Provan [29] considered belief functions as ”probabilities of provability”.
Still another view has been developed in connection with rough set theory [13], [39], [40].
Belief function is considered as the lower approximation of the set of possible decisions.
Fagin and Halpern [10] postulated probabilistic interpretation of DST around lower and
upper probability measures defined over a probability structure (rather than space).
Halpern and Fagin [14] proposed to treat Bel as a generalized probability and proposed
a rule of combination of evidence differing from the one of Dempster and Shafer.
The list of other attempts is quite long, still a number of attempts to interpret belief
functions in terms of probabilities have failed so far to produce a fully compatible interpre-
tation with DST - see e.g. [23], [14], [10] etc. Shafer [37] and Smets [41], in defense of DST,
dismissed every attempt to interpret DST frequentistically. Shafer stressed that even modern
(that meant bayesian) statistics is not frequentistic at all (bayesian theory assigns subjective
probabilities), hence frequencies be no matter at all. Smets stated that domains of DST
applications are those where ”we are ignorant of the existence of probabilities”, and warns
that DST is ”not a model for poorly known probabilities” ([41], p.324). Smets states further
”Far too often, authors concentrate on the static component (how beliefs are allocated?) and
discover many relations between TBM (transferable belief model of Smets) and ULP (upper
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lower probability) models, inner and outer measures (Fagin and Halpern [9]), random sets
(Nguyen [25]), probabilities of provability (Pearl [26]), probabilities of necessity (Ruspini
[32]) etc. But these authors usually do not explain or justify the dynamic component (how
are beliefs updated?), that is, how updating (conditioning) is to be handled (except in some
cases by defining conditioning as a special case of combination). So I (that is Smets) feel
that these partial comparisons are incomplete, especially as all these interpretations lead to
different updating rules.” ([41], pp. 324-325).
Shafer in [37] claims that probability theory developed over last years from the old-style
frequencies towards modern subjective probability theory within the framework of bayesian
theory. By analogy he claims that the very attempt to consider relation between DST and
frequencies is old-fashioned and out of date and should be at least forbidden - for the sake of
progress of humanity. Wasserman opposes this view ([43], p.371) reminding ”major success
story in Bayesian theory”, the exchangeability theory of de Finetti [4]. It treats frequencies
as special case of bayesian belief. ”The Bayesian theory contains within it a definition of
frequency probability and a description of the exact assumptions necessary to invoke that
definition” [43]. Wasserman dismisses Shafer’s suggestion that probability relies on analogy
of frequency. .
Though the need of a frequentist interpretation of DST is obvious, critical remarks of
Smets cannot be however ignored. Therefore, still another attempt of probabilistic inter-
pretation is made in this paper. Within this paper we assume strong mutual relationship
between the way an inference engine reasons, the way one understands the inputs and out-
puts and the way knowledge is represented -m and acquired. Section 2 reminds some basic
terms of DST. Section 3 presents the way we understand the belief function and the relation-
ship between reasoning system input and output. In section 4 we assume a particular type
of inference engine - Shenoy-Shafer method of local computations (for presentation of this
method the reader should consult the original paper of them [38]). Then we demonstrate
how our understanding of belief function and this particular inference mechanism imply
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knowledge representation in terms of a new DS belief network. Section 5 and 6 show how
the results of section 4 lead to two learning algorithms recovering a tree-structured and poly-
tree-structured resp. belief network from data. Section 7 makes use of independence results
obtained in section 3 to develop an algorithm recovering general type DS belief networks from
data. Some implications of this uniform view of belief functions, reasoning, representation
and acquisition are discussed in section 8. Conclusions are summarized in section 9.
2 Basics of DST
Let us first remind basic definitions of DST:
Definition 1 (see [29]) Let Ξ be a finite set of elements called elementary events. Any
subset of Ξ be a composite event. Ξ be called also the frame of discernment.
A basic probability assignment function is any function m:2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A∈2Ξ
|m(A)| = 1, m(∅) = 0, ∀A∈2Ξ 0 ≤
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
(|.| - absolute value.
A belief function be defined as Bel:2Ξ → [0, 1] so that Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆Am(B) A plausibility
function be Pl:2Ξ → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ P l(A) = 1 − Bel(Ξ − A) A commonality function be
Q:2Ξ − {∅} → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ−{∅} Q(A) =
∑
A⊆Bm(B)
Furthermore, a Rule of Combination of two Independent Belief Functions Bel1, Bel2
Over the Same Frame of Discernment (the so-called Dempster-Rule), denoted
BelE1,E2 = BelE1 ⊕BelE2
is defined as follows: :
mE1,E2(A) = c ·
∑
B,C;A=B∩C
mE1(B) ·mE2(C)
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(c - constant normalizing the sum of |m| to 1)
Furthermore, let the frame of discernment Ξ be structured in that it is identical to
cross product of domains Ξ1, Ξ2, . . . Ξn of n discrete variables X1, X2, . . .Xn, which span the
space Ξ. Let (x1, x2, . . . xn) be a vector in the space spanned by the variables X1, , X2, . . .Xn.
Its projection onto the subspace spanned by variables Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk (j1, j2, . . . jk distinct
indices from the set 1,2,. . . ,n) is then the vector (xj1, xj2 , . . . xjk). (x1, x2, . . . xn) is also
called an extension of (xj1 , xj2, . . . xjk). A projection of a set A of such vectors is the set
A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk of projections of all individual vectors from A onto Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk . A is also
called an extension of A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk . A is called the vacuous extension of A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk iff
A contains all possible extensions of each individual vector in A↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk . The fact, that
A is a vacuous extension of B onto space X1, X2, . . . Xn is denoted by A = B
↑X1,X2,...Xn
Definition 2 (see [38]) Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space of
discernment spanned by variables X1, X2, . . . Xn. m
↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk is called the projection of m
onto subspace spanned by Xj1 , Xj2, . . .Xjk iff
m↓Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk (B) = c ·
∑
A;B=A
↓Xj1
,Xj2
,...Xjk
m(A)
(c - normalizing factor)
Definition 3 (see [38]) Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space of dis-
cernment spanned by variables Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk . m
↑X1,X2,...Xn is called the vacuous extension
of m onto superspace spanned by X1, X2, . . . Xn iff
m↑X1,X2,...Xn(B↑X1,X2,...Xn) = m(B)
and m↑X1,X2,...Xn(A) = 0 for any other A.
We say that a belief function is vacuous iff m(Ξ) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for any A different from
Ξ.
Projections and vacuous extensions of Bel, Pl and Q functions are defined with respect to
operations on m function. Notice that by convention if we want to combine by Dempster rule
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two belief functions not sharing the frame of discernment, we look for the closest common
vacuous extension of their frames of discernment without explicitly notifying it.
Definition 4 (See [36]) Let B be a subset of Ξ, called evidence, mB be a basic probability
assignment such that mB(B) = 1 and mB(A) = 0 for any A different from B. Then the con-
ditional belief function Bel(.||B) representing the belief function Bel conditioned on evidence
B is defined as: Bel(.||B) = Bel ⊕ BelB.
The subsequent definitions of hypergraphs and operations on them are due to [38].
Hypergraphs: A nonempty set H of nonempty subsets of a finite set S be called a hyper-
graph on S. The elements of H be called hyperedges. Elements of S be called vertices. H
and H’ be both hypergraphs on S, then we call a hypergraph H’ a reduced hypergraph of the
hypergraph H, iff for every h′ ∈ H ′ also h′ ∈ H holds, and for every h ∈ H there exists such
a h′ ∈ H ′ that h ⊆ h′.A hypergraph H covers a hypergraph H’ iff for every h′ ∈ H ′ there
exists such a h ∈ H that h′ ⊆ h.
Hypertrees: t and b be distinct hyperedges in a hypergraph H, t ∩ b 6= ∅, and b contains
every vertex of t that is contained in a hyperedge of H other than t; if X ∈ t and X ∈ h,
where h ∈ H and h 6= t, then X ∈ b. Then we call t a twig of H, and we call b a branch
for t. A twig may have more than one branch. We call a hypergraph a hypertree if there
is an ordering of its hyperedges, say h1, h2, ..., hn such that hk is a twig in the hypergraph
{h1,h 2, ..., hk} whenever 2 ≤ k ≤ n. We call any such ordering of hyperedges a hypertree
construction sequence for the hypertree. The first hyperedge in the hypertree construction
sequence be called the root of the hypertree construction sequence.
Variables and valuations:Let V be a finite set. The elements of V are called variables.
For each h ⊆ V there is a set V Vh. The elements of V Vh are called valuations. Let
VV=
⋃
{V Vh|h ⊆ V} be called the set of all valuations.
In case of probabilities a valuation on h will be a non-negative, real-valued function on
the set of all configurations of h(a configuration on h is a vector of possible values of variables
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in h). In the belief function case a valuation is a non-negative, real-valued function on the
set of all subsets of configurations of h.
Proper valuation: for each h ⊆ V there is a subset Ph of V Vh elements of which are called
proper valuations on h. Let P be the set of all proper valuations.
Combination: We assume that there is a mapping ⊙ : V V × V V → V V called combina-
tion such that:
(i) if G and H are valuations on g and h respectively, then G⊙H is a valuation on g ∪ h
(ii) if either G or H is not a proper valuation then G⊙H is not a proper valuation
(iii) if both G and H are proper valuations then G⊙H may be or not be a proper valuation
Factorization: Suppose A is a valuation on a finite set of variables V , and suppose HV
is a hypergraph on V . If A is equal to the combination of valuations of all hyperedges h of
HV then we say that A factorizes on HV.
3 An Interpretation of DST
Let us assume that we know that objects of a population can be described by an intrinsic
attribute X taking exclusively one of the n discrete values from its domain Ξ = {v1, v2, ..., vn}
. Let us assume furthermore that to obtain knowledge of the actual value taken by an object
we must apply a measurement method (a system of tests) M
Definition 5 X be a set-valued attribute taking as its values non-empty subsets of a finite
domain Ξ. By a measurement method of value of the attribute X we understand a function:
M : Ω× 2Ξ → {TRUE, FALSE}
. where Ω is the set of objects, (or population of objects) such that
• ∀ω;ω∈Ω M(ω,Ξ) = TRUE (X takes at least one of values from Ξ)
• ∀ω;ω∈Ω M(ω, ∅) = FALSE
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• whenever M(ω,A) = TRUE for ω ∈ Ω, A ⊆ Ξ then for any B such that A ⊂ B
M(ω,B) = TRUE holds,
• whenever M(ω,A) = TRUE for ω ∈ Ω, A ⊆ Ξ and if card(A) > 1 then there exists
B, B ⊂ A such that M(ω,B) = TRUE holds.
• for every ω and every A either M(ω,A) = TRUE or M(ω,A) = FALSE (but never
both).
M(ω,A) tells us whether or not any of the elements of the set A belong to the actual value
of the attribute X for the object ω.
The measuring function M(O,A), if it takes the value TRUE, states for an object O and
a set A of values from the domain of X that the X takes for this object (at least) one of the
values in A.
With each application of the measurement procedure some costs be connected, increasing
roughly with the decreasing size of the tested set A so that we are ready to accept results of
previous measurements in the form of pre-labeling of the population. So
Definition 6 A label L of an object ω ∈ Ω is a subset of the domain Ξ of the attribute X.
A labeling under the measurement method M is a function l : Ω → 2Ξ such that for any
object ω ∈ Ω either l(ω) = ∅ or M(ω, l(ω)) = TRUE.
Each labelled object (under the labeling l) consists of a pair (Oj, Lj), Oj - the j
th object,
Lj = l(Oj) - its label.
By a population under the labeling l we understand the predicate P : Ω→ {TRUE, FALSE}
of the form P (ω) = TRUE iff l(ω) 6= ∅ (or alternatively, the set of objects for which this
predicate is true)
If for every object of the population the label is equal to Ξ then we talk of an unlabeled
population (under the labeling l), otherwise of a pre-labelled one.
Let us assume that in practice we apply a modified measurement method Ml being a
function:
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Definition 7 Let l be a labeling under the measurement method M . Let us consider the
population under this labeling. The modified measurement method
Ml : Ω× 2
Ξ → {TRUE, FALSE}
where Ω is the set of objects, is is defined as
Ml(ω,A) =M(ω,A ∩ l(ω))
(Notice that Ml(ω,A) = FALSE whenever A ∩ l(ω) = ∅.)
For a labeled object (Oj, Lj) (Oj - proper object, Lj - its label) and a set A of values
from the domain of X, the modified measurement method tells us that X takes one of the
values in A if and only if it takes in fact a value from intersection of A and Lj . Expressed
differently, we discard a priori any attribute not in the label.
Please pay attention also to the fact, that given a population P for which the measure-
ment method M is defined, the labeling l (according to its definition) selects a subset of
this population, possibly a proper subset, namely the population P’ under this labeling.
P ′(ω) = P (ω) ∧M(ω, l(ω)). Hence also Ml is defined possibly for the ”smaller” population
P’ than M is.
Let us define the following functions referred to as labelled Belief, labelled Plausibil-
ity and labelled Mass Functions respectively for the labeled population P: The predicate
Prob
P (ω)
ω
α(ω) shall denote the probability of truth of expression α(ω) over ω given popula-
tion P (ω).
Definition 8 Let P be a population and l its labeling. Then
BelMlP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
¬Ml(ω,Ξ− A)
P lMlP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
Ml(ω,A)
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mMlP (A) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(
∧
B;B={vi}⊆A
Ml(ω,B) ∧
∧
B;B={vi}⊆Ξ−A
¬Ml(ω,B))
THEOREM 1 mMlP , Bel
Ml
P , P l
Ml
P and Q
Ml
P are the mass, belief, plausibility and common-
ality Functions in the sense of DST.
Let us now assume we run a ”(re-)labelling process” on the (pre-labelled or unlabeled)
population P.
Definition 9 Let M be a measurement method, l be a labeling under this measurement
method, and P be a population under this labeling (Note that the population may also be
unlabeled). The (simple) labelling process on the population P is defined as a functional
LP : 2Ξ×Γ→ Γ, where Γ is the set of all possible labelings under M , such that for the given
labeling l and a given nonempty set of attribute values L (L ⊆ Ξ), it delivers a new labeling
l′ (l′ = LP (L, l)) such that for every object ω ∈ Ω:
1. if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE then l
′(ω) = ∅
(that is l’ discards a labeled object (ω, l(ω)) if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE
2. otherwise l′(ω) = l(ω) ∩ L (that is l’ labels the object with l(ω) ∩ L otherwise.
Remark: It is immediately obvious, that the population obtained as the sample fulfills
the requirements of the definition of a labeled population.
The labeling process clearly induces from P another population P’ (a population under
the labeling l′) being a subset of P (hence perhaps ”smaller” than P) labelled a bit differently.
If we retain the primary measurement method M then a new modified measurement method
Ml′ is induced by the new labeling.
Definition 10 ”labelling process function” mLP ;L : 2Ξ → [0, 1]: is defined as:
mLP ;L(L) = 1
∀B;B∈2Ξ,B 6=Lm
LP ;L(B) = 0
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It is immediately obvious that:
THEOREM 2 mLP ;L is a Mass Function in sense of DST.
Let BelLP,L be the belief and P lLP,L be the Plausibility corresponding to mLP,L. Now let
us pose the question: what is the relationship between Bel
Ml′
P ′ , Bel
Ml
P , and Bel
LP,L.
THEOREM 3 Let M be a measurement function, l a labeling, P a population under this
labeling. Let L be a subset of Ξ. Let LP be a labeling process and let l′ = LP (L, l). Let P’ be
a population under the labeling l′. Then Bel
Ml′
P ′ is a combination via Dempster’s Combination
rule of BelMl, and BelLP ;L., that is:
Bel
Ml′
P ′ = Bel
Ml
P ⊕Bel
LP ;L
.
Let us define a more general (re-)labeling process. Instead of a single set of attribute
values let us take a set of sets of attribute values L1, L2, ..., Lk (not necessarily disjoint) and
assign to each one a probability mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk(Ai) of selection.
Definition 11 Let M be a measurement method, l be a labeling under this measurement
method, and P be a population under this labeling (Note that the population may also be
unlabeled). Let us take a set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of attribute values
{L1, L2, ..., Lk} and let us define the probability of selection as a function mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk :
2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A;A⊆Ξ
mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk(A) = 1
∀A;A∈{L1,L2,...,Lk}m
LP,L1,L2,...,Lk(A) > 0
∀A;A 6∈{L1,L2,...,Lk}m
LP,L1,L2,...,Lk(A) = 0
The (general) labelling process on the population P is defined as a (randomized) functional
LP : 22
Ξ
× ∆ × Γ → Γ, where Γ is the set of all possible labelings under M , and ∆ is a
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set of all possible probability of selection functions, such that for the given labeling l and a
given set of (not necessarily disjoint) nonempty sets of attribute values {L1, L2, ..., Lk} and
a given probability of selection mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk it delivers a new labeling l” such that for every
object ω ∈ Ω:
1. a label L, element of the set {L1, L2, ..., Lk} is sampled randomly according to the prob-
ability distribution mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk; This sampling is done independently for each individual
object,
2. if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE then l”(ω) = ∅
(that is l” discards an object (ω, l(ω)) if Ml(ω, L) = FALSE
3. otherwise l”(ω) = l(ω) ∩ L (that is l” labels the object with l(ω) ∩ L otherwise.)
Again we obtain another (”smaller”) population P” under the labeling l” labelled a bit
differently. Also a new modified measurement method Ml” is induced by the ”re-labelled”
population. Please notice, that l” is not derived deterministicly. Another run of the general
(re-)labeling process LP may result in a different final labeling of the population and hence
a different subpopulation under this new labeling.
Clearly:
THEOREM 4 mLP,L
1,...,Lk is a Mass Function in sense of DST.
Let BelLP ;L
1,...,Lk be the belief and P lLP,L
1,...,Lk be the Plausibility corresponding to
mLP,L
1,...,Lk. Now let us pose the question: what is the relationship between BelMl”P” , Bel
Ml
P ,
and BelLP,L
1,...,Lk.
THEOREM 5 Let M be a measurement function, l a labeling, P a population under this
labeling. Let LP be a generalized labeling process and let l” be the result of application of
the LP for the set of labels from the set {L1, L2, ..., Lk} sampled randomly according to the
probability distribution mLP,L
1,L2,...,Lk;. Let P” be a population under the labeling l”. Then
The expected value over the set of all possible resultant labelings l” (and hence populations P”)
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(or, more precisely, value vector) of BelMl”P” is a combination via Dempster’s Combination
rule of BelMlP , and Bel
LP,L1,...,Lk., that is:
E(Bel
M ′
l
P” ) = Bel
Ml
P ⊕Bel
LP,L1,...,Lk
.
Let us now introduce the notion of quantitative independence for DS-Theory. We will
fix the measurement method M we use and the population P we consider so that respective
indices will be usually dropped.
Definition 12 Two variables X1, X2 are (mutually, marginally) independent when for ob-
jects of the population knowledge of the truth value of M↓X1l (ω,A
↓X1) for all A ⊆ Ξ1×Ξ2 does
not change our prediction capability of the values of M↓X2l (ω,B
↓X2) for any B ⊆ Ξ1 × Ξ2,
that is
ProbP (ω)
ω
(M↓X2l (ω,B
↓X2) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(M↓X2l (ω,B
↓X2)|M↓X1l (ω,A
↓X1))
THEOREM 6 If variables X1, X2 are quantitatively independent, then for any B ⊆ Ξ2,
A ⊆ Ξ1
m↓X2(B) ·m↓X1(A) =
∑
F ;F ↓X1=A,F ↓X2=B
m(F )
THEOREM 7 If variables X1, X2 are quantitatively independent, then for any B ⊆ Ξ2,
A ⊆ Ξ1
Bel↓X2(B) · Bel↓X1(A) = Bel(A× B)
This actually expresses the relationship between marginals of two independent variables
and their joint belief distribution. This relationship has one dismaying aspect: in general, we
cannot calculate the joint distribution from independent marginals (contrary to our intuition
connected with joint probability distribution).
In practical settings, however, we frequently have to do with some kind of composite
measurement method, that is:
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Definition 13 Two variables X1, X2 are measured compositely iff for A ⊆ Ξ1, B ⊆ Ξ2:
M(ω,A× C) = M(ω,A× Ξ2) ∧M(ω,Ξ1 × C)
and whenever M(ω,B) is sought,
M(ω,B) =
∨
A,C;A⊆Ξ1,C⊆Ξ2,A×C⊆B
M(ω,A× B)
Under these circumstances, it is easily shown that whenever m(B) > 0, then there exist
A and C such that: B = A× C.
So we obtain:
THEOREM 8 If variables X1, X2 are quantitatively independent and measured compos-
itely, then
m(A× C) = m↓X1(A) ·m↓X2(C)
Hence the Belief function can be calculated from Belief functions of independent variables
under composite measurement.:
THEOREM 9 If variables X1, X2 are quantitatively independent and measured compos-
itely, then
Bel = Bel↓X1 ⊕Bel↓X2
Let us justify now the notion of empty extension:
Definition 14 The joint distribution over X = X1×X2 in variables X1, X2 is independent
of the variable X1 when for objects of the population for every A,A ⊆ Ξ1 × Ξ2 knowledge of
the truth value of M↓X1l (ω,A
↓X1) does not change our prediction capability of the values of
Ml(ω,A), that is
ProbP (ω)
ω
(Ml(ω,A)) =
ProbP (ω)
ω
(Ml(ω,A)|M
↓X1
l (ω,A
↓X1))
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THEOREM 10 The joint distribution over X = X1 × X2 in variables X1, X2, measured
compositely, is independent of the variable X1 only if m
↓X2(Ξ2) = 1 that is the whole mass
of the marginalized distribution onto X2 is concentrated at the only focal point Ξ2.
THEOREM 11 If for X = X1 ×X2 Bel = (Bel
↓X2)↑X that is Bel is the empty extension
of some Bel defined only over X2, then the Bel is independent of the variable X2.
If for a Bel over X = X1 ×X2 with X1, X2 measured compositely Bel is independent of X2,
then Bel = (Bel↓X2)↑X .
Definition 15 Let Bel be defined over X1 × X2. We shall speak that Bel is compressibly
independent of X2 iff Bel = (Bel
↓X1)↑X2.
REMARK: m↓X1(Ξ1) = 1 does not imply empty extension as such, especially for non-
singleton values of the variable X2. As previously with marginal independence, it is the
composite measurement that makes the empty extension a practical notion.
Let us introduce a concept of conditionality related to the above definition of indepen-
dence. Traditionally, conditionality is introduced to obtain a kind of independence between
variables de facto on one another. So let us define that:
Definition 16 For discourse spaces of the form X = X1×...×Xn we define (anti-)conditional
belief function BelX|Xi(A) as
Bel = Bel↓Xi ⊕ BelX|Xi
Let us notice at this point that the (anti-)conditional belief as defined above does not need
to be unique, hence we have here a kind of pseudoinversion of the ⊕ operator. Furthermore,
the conditional belief does not need to be a belief function at all, because some focal points
m may be negative. But it is then the pseudo-belief function in the sense of the DS-theory
as the Q-measure remains positive. Please recall the fact that if Bel12 = Bel1 ⊕ Bel2 then
Q12(A) = c · Q1(A) · Q2(A), c being a proportionality factor (as all supersets of a set are
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contained in all intersections of its supersets and vice versa). Hence also for our conditional
belief definition:
Q(A) = c · (Q↓Xi)↑X(A) ·QX|Xi(A)
We shall talk later of unnormalized conditional belief iff
QX|Xi∗ (A) = Q(A)/(Q
↓Xi)↑X(A)
Let us now reconsider the problem of independence, this time of a conditional distribution
of (X1 ×X2 ×X3|X1 ×X3) from the third variable X3.
THEOREM 12 Let X = X1 × X2 × X3 and let Bel be defined over X. Furthermore let
BelX|X1×X3 be a conditional Belief conditioned on variables X1, X3. Let this conditional
distribution be compressibly independent of X3. Let Bel
↓X1×X2 be the projection of Bel onto
the subspace spanned by X1, X2. Then there exists Bel
↓X1×X2|X1 being a conditional belief of
that projected belief conditioned on the variable X1 such that this Bel
X|X1×X3 is the empty
extension of Bel↓X1×X2|X1
BelX|X1×X3 = (Bel↓X1×X2|X1)↑X
Let us notice that under the conditions of the above theorem
Bel = BelX|X1×X3 ⊕Bel↓X1×X3 = Bel↓X1×X2|X1 ⊕ Bel↓X1×X3
and hence for any Bel↓X1×X3|X1
Bel = Bel↓X1×X2|X1 ⊕ Bel↓X1 ⊕ Bel↓X1×X3|X1
and therefore
Bel = Bel↓X1×X2 ⊕Bel↓X1×X3|X1
This means that whenever the conditional BelX1×X2×X3|X1×X3 is compressibly independent
of X3, then there exists a conditional Bel
X1×X2×X3|X1×X2 compressibly independent of X2.
But this fact combined with the previous theorem results in:
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THEOREM 13 Let X = X1 × X2 × X3 and let Bel be defined over X. Furthermore let
BelX|X1×X3 be a conditional Belief conditioned on variables X1, X3. Let this conditional
distribution be compressibly independent of X3. Then the empty extension onto X of any
Bel↓X1×X2|X1 being a conditional belief of projected belief conditioned on the variable X1 is a
conditional belief function of X conditioned on variables X1, X3. Hence for every A ⊆ Ξ
Q(A)
Q↓X1×X3(A↓X1×X3)
=
Q↓X1×X2(A↓X1×X2)
Q↓X1(A↓X1)
In this way we obtained some sense of conditionality suitable for decomposition of a joint
belief distribution.
3.1 Independence from Data
The preceding sections defined precisely what is meant by marginal independence of two
variables in terms of the relationship between marginals and the joint distribution, as well
as concerning the independence of a joint distribution from a single variable.
For the former case we can establish frequency tables with rows and columns correspond-
ing to cardinalities of focal points of the first and the second marginal, and inner elements
being cardinalities from the respective sum on DS-masses of the joint distribution. Clearly,
cases falling into different inner categories of the table are different and hence χ2 test is
applicable.
The match can be χ2-tested. The following formula should be followed for calculation
∑
A;A⊆Ξ1,m↓X1(A)>0
∑
B;B⊆Ξ2,m↓X2(B)>0
((
∑
C;C⊆Ξ,A=C↓X1B=C↓X2 m(C))−m
↓X1(A) ·m↓X2(B))2
m↓X1(A) ·m↓X2(B)
The number of df is calculated as
(card({A;A ⊆ Ξ1, m
↓X1(A) > 0})− 1) · (card({B;B ⊆ Ξ2, m
↓X2(B) > 0})− 1)
In case of independence of a distribution from one variable one needs to calculate the
marginal of the distribution of that variable, say Xi. Then the measure of discrepancy from
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the assumption of independence is given as:
1−m↓Xi(Ξi)
Statistically we can test, based on Bernoullie distribution, what is the lowest possible and
the highest possible value of 1−m↓Xi(Ξi) for a given significance level of the true underlying
distribution.
3.2 Conditional Independence from Data
In case of independence between the conditional distribution and one of conditioning vari-
ables, however, it is useless to calculate the pseudoinversion of ⊕, as we are working then
with a population and a sample the size of which is not properly defined (by the ”anti-
labeling”). But we can build the contingency table of the unconditional joint distribution
for the independent variable on the one hand and the remaining variables on the other hand,
and compare the respective cells on how do they match the distribution we would obtain
assuming the independence. The number of degrees of freedom for the χ2 test would then be
the number of focal points of the joint distribution, minus the number of focal points within
each of the multi-variable marginals plus one (for covering twice the total sum of 1 on all
focal points).
If we test conditional independence of variables X and Y on the set of variables Z, then
we have to compare empirical distribution Bel↓X,Y,Z with Bel↓X,Z|Z⊕Bel↓Y,Z|Z⊕Bel↓Z . The
traditional χ2 statistics is computed (treating the latter distribution as expected one). If the
hypothesis of equality is rejected on significance level α = 0.05 then X and Y are considered
dependent, otherwise independent.
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4 A Concept of Belief Network
The axiomatization system of Shenoy/Shafer refers to the notion of factorization along a
hypergraph. On the other hand other authors insisted on a decomposition into a belief
network. We investigate below implications of this disagreement. BEl shall denote the
general belief function as considered in [38], the DS belief function Bel and the probability
are specialization of.
Definition 17 [18] We define a mapping ⊙ : V V × V V → V V called decombination such
that: if BEL12 = BEL1⊙BEL2 then BEL1 = BEL2 ⊙BEL12.
In case of probabilities, decombination means memberwise division: Pr12(A) = Pr1(A)/Pr2(A).
In case of DS pseudo-belief functions it means the operator ⊖ yielding a DS pseudo-belief
function such that: whenever Bel12 = Bel1 ⊖ Bel2 then Q12(A) = c · Q1/Q2. Both for
probabilities and for DS belief functions decombination may be not uniquely determined.
Moreover, for DS belief functions not always a decombined DS belief function will exist. But
the domain of DS pseudo-belief functions is closed under this operator. We claim here with-
out a proof (which is simple) that DS pseudo-belief functions fit the axiomatic framework of
Shenoy/Shafer. Moreover, we claim that if an (ordinary) DS belief function is represented by
a factorization in DS pseudo-belief functions, then any propagation of uncertainty yields the
very same results as when it would have been factorized into ordinary DS belief functions.
Definition 18 [18] By anti-conditioning | of a belief function BEL on a set of variables h
we understand the transformation: BEL|h = BEL⊙BEL↓h.
Notably, anti-conditioning means in case of probability functions proper conditioning. In
case of DS pseudo-belief functions the operator | means the DS anti-conditioning from pre-
vious section. It has meaning entirely different from traditionally used Shafer’s notion of
conditionality (compare [17]) - anti-conditioning is a technical term used exclusively for val-
uation of nodes in belief networks. Notice: some other authors e.g. [2] recognized also the
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necessity of introduction of two different notions in the context of the Shenoy/Shafer ax-
iomatic framework (compare a priori and a posteriori conditionals in [2]). [2] introduces 3
additional axioms governing the ’a priori’ conditionality to enable propagation with them.
Our anti-conditionality is bound only to the assumption of executability of the ⊙ operation
and does not assume any further properties of it. Let us define now the general notion of
belief networks
Definition 19 [18] A belief network is a pair (D,BEL) where D is a dag (directed acyclic
graph) and BEL is a belief distribution called the underlying distribution. Each node i in D
corresponds to a variable Xi in BEL, a set of nodes I corresponds to a set of variables XI
and xi, xI denote values drawn from the domain of Xi and from the (cross product) domain
of XI respectively. Each node in the network is regarded as a storage cell for any distribution
BEL↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i) where Xpi(i) is a set of nodes corresponding to the parent nodes pi(i) of i.
The underlying distribution represented by a belief network is computed via:
BEL =
n⊙
i=1
BEL↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i)
Please notice the local character of valuation of a node: to valuate the node i corresponding
to variable Xi only the marginal BEL
↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i) needs to be known (e.g. from data) and not
the entire belief distribution.
There exists a straight forward transformation of a belief network structure into a hyper-
graph, and hence of a belief network into a hypergraph: for every node i of the underlying
dag define a hyperedge as the set {Xi} ∪Xpi(i); then the valuation of this hyperedge define
as BEL↓{Xi}∪Xpi(i)|Xpi(i). We say that the hypergraph obtained in this way is induced by the
belief network.
Let us consider now the inverse operation: transformation of a valuated hypergraph into
a belief network. As the first stage we consider structures of a hypergraph and of a belief
network (the underlying dag). we say that a belief network is compatible with a hypergraph
iff the reduced set of hyperedges induced by the belief network is identical with the reduced
hypergraph.
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Example 1 Let us consider the following hypergraph {{A,B,C}, {C,D}, {D,E}, {A, E}}.
the following belief network structures are compatible with this hypergraph: {A,C → B,
C → D, D → E, E → A} {A,C → B, D → C, D → E, E → A}, {A,C → B, D → C,
E → D, E → A}, {A,C → B, D → C, E → D, A→ E}. ✸
Example 2 Let us consider the following hypergraph {{A,B,C}, {C,D}, {D,E}, {A, E},
{B,F}, {F,D}}. No belief network structure is compatible with it. ✸
The missing compatibility is connected with the fact that a hypergraph may represent a
cyclic graph. Even if a compatible belief network has been found we may have troubles with
valuations. In Example 1 an unfriendly valuation of hyperedge {A,C,B} may require an edge
AC in a belief network representing the same distribution, but it will make the hypergraph
incompatible (as e.g. hyperedge {A,C,E} would be induced). This may be demonstrated as
follows:
Definition 20 [18] If XJ , XK , XL are three disjoint sets of variables of a distribution BEL,
then XJ , XK are said to be conditionally independent given XL (denoted
I(XJ , XK |XL)BEL iff
BEL↓XJ∪XK∪XL|XL ⊙ BEL↓XL = BEL↓XJ∪XL|XL ⊙ BEL↓XK∪XL|XL ⊙ BEL↓XL
I(XJ , XK |XL)BEL is called a conditional independence statement
Let I(J,K|L)D denote d-separation in a graph [11].:
THEOREM 14 [18] Let BELD = {BEL|(D,BEL) be a belief network}. Then:
I(J,K|L)D iff I(XJ , XK |XL)BEL for all BEL ∈ BELD.
Now we see in the above example that nodes D and E d-separate nodes A and C. Hence
within any belief network based on one of the three dags mentioned A will be conditionally
independent from C given D and E. But one can easily check that with general type of
hypergraph valuation nodes A and C may be rendered dependent.
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THEOREM 15 [18] Hypergraphs considered by Shenoy/Shafer [38] may for a given joint
belief distribution have simpler structure than (be properly covered by) the closest hypergraph
induced by a belief network.
Notably, though the axiomatic system of Shenoy/Shafer refers to hypergraph factorization of
a joint belief distribution, the actual propagation is run on a hypertree (or more precisely, on
one construction sequence of a hypertree, that is on Markov tree) covering that hypergraph
[38]. Let us look closer at the outcome of the process of covering with a reduced hypertree
factorization, or more precisely, at the relationship of a hypertree construction sequence and
a belief network constructed out of it in the following way:If hk is a twig in the sequence
{h1, ..., hk} and hik its branch with ik < k, then let us span the following directed edges in
a belief network: First make a complete directed acyclic graph out of nodes hk − hik . Then
add edges Yl → Xj for every Yl ∈ hk ∩ hik and every Xj ∈ hk − hik . Repeat this for every
k=2,..,n. For k=1 proceed as if h1 were a twig with an empty set as a branch for it. It is
easily checked that the hypergraph induced by a belief network structure obtained in this
way is in fact a hypertree (if reduced, then exactly the original reduced hypertree). Let us
turn now to valuations. Let BELi be the valuation originally attached to the hyperedge
hi. then BEL = BEL1 ⊙ ... ⊙ BELn. What conditional belief is to be attached to hn
? First marginalize: BEL′n = BEL
↓h1∩hn
1 ⊙ . . . ⊙ BEL
↓hn−1∩hn
n−1 ⊙ BELn. Now calculate:
BEL”n = BEL
′|hn∩hin
n , and BEL”
′
n = BEL
′↓hn∩hin
n . Let BEL∗k = BELk⊙BEL
↓h1∩hn
k for
k=1,...,in-1,in+1,...,(n-1), and let BEL∗in = (BELin⊙BEL
↓h1∩hn
in
) ⊙ BEL”′n . Obviously,
BEL = BEL∗1 ⊙ . . .⊙BEL∗(n−1) ⊙BEL”n Now let us consider a new hypertree only with
hyperedges h1, . . . hn−1, and with valuations equal to those marked with asterisk (*), and
repeat the process until only one hyperedge is left, the now valuation of which is considered
as BEL”1. In the process, a new factorization is obtained: BEL = BEL”1 ⊙ . . .⊙BEL”n.
If now for a hyperedge hk card(hk − hik) = 1, then we assign BEL”k to the node of the
belief network corresponding to hk − hik . If for a hyperedge hk card(hk − hik) > 1, then we
split BEL”k as follows: Let hk −hik = {Xk1, Xk2, ...., Xkm} and the indices shall correspond
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to the order in the belief network induced by the above construction procedure. Then
BEL”k = BEL
↓hk |hk∩hik =
m⊙
j=1
BEL↓(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}|(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}−{Xkj}
and we assign valuation BEL↓(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}|(hk∩hik )∪{Xk1,...,Xkj}−{Xkj} to the node corre-
sponding to Xkj in the network structure. It is easily checked that:
THEOREM 16 [18] (i) The network obtained by the above construction of its structure
and valuation from hypertree factorization is a belief network.
(ii) This belief network represents exactly the joint belief distribution of the hypertree
(iii) This belief network induces exactly the original reduced hypertree structure
The above theorem implies that any hypergraph suitable for propagation must have a com-
patible belief network. Hence seeking for belief network decompositions of joint belief dis-
tributions is sufficient for finding any suitable factorization.
5 Recovery of Tree-structured Belief Networks
Let us consider now a special class of hypertrees: connected hypertrees with cardinality of
each hyperedge equal 2. It is easy to demonstrate that such hypertrees correspond exactly to
directed trees. Furthermore, valuated hypergraphs of this form correspond to belief networks
with directed trees as underlying dag structures. Hence we can conclude that any factor-
ization in form of connected hypertrees with cardinality of each hyperedge equal 2 may be
recovered from data by algorithms recovering belief trees from data.This does not hold e.g.
for poly-trees.
Let us assume that there exists a measure δ(BEL1, BEL2) equal to zero whenever both
belief distributions BEL1, BEL2 are identical and being positive otherwise. Furthermore,
we assume that δ grows with stronger deviation of both distributions without specifying
it further. The algorithm of Chow/Liu [3] for recovery of tree structure of a probability
distribution is well known and has been deeply investigated, so we will omit its description.
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It requires a distance measure DEP(X,Y) between each two variables X,Y rooted in empirical
data and spans a maximum weight spanning unoriented tree between the nodes. Then any
orientation of the tree is the underlying dag structure where valuations are calculated as
conditional probabilities. To accommodate it for general belief trees one needs a proper
measure of distance between variables. As claimed earlier in [1], this distance measure has
to fulfill the following requirement: min(DEP (X, Y ), DEP (Y, Z)) > DEP (X,Z) for any
X, Y, Z such that there exists a directed path between X and Y, and between Y and Z. For
probabilistic belief networks one of such functions is known to be Kullback-Leibler distance:
DEP0(X, Y ) =
∑
x,y
P (x, y) · log
P (x, y)
P (x) ∗ P (y)
If we have the measure δ available, we can construct the measure DEP as follows: By the
ternary joint distribution of the variables X1, X3 with background X3 we understand the
function:
BEL↓X1×X2[X3] = (BEL↓X1×X3|X3 ⊙BEL↓X2×X3|X3 ⊙ BEL↓X3)↓X1×X2
Then we introduce:
DEPBN(X1, X2) = min(δ(BEL
↓X1 ⊙ BEL↓X2 , BEL↓X1×X2),
, min
X3;X3∈V−X1,X2
δ(BEL↓X1×X2[X3], BEL↓X1×X2))
with V being the set of all variables.The following theorem is easy to prove:
THEOREM 17 [18] min(DEPBN(X, Y ), DEPBN(Y, Z)) > DEPBN (X,Z) for any X, Y,
Z such that there exists a directed path between X and Y, and between Y and Z.
This suffices to extend the Chow/Liu algorithm to recover general belief tree networks from
data.
The general algorithm would be of the form:
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A) E be the set of unoriented edges, V be the set of all (at least 3) variables, Vc be the
set of connected variables, Vu be the set of not connected variables. Find the variables
X,Y from V maximizing the function DEPBN(X, Y ) for all pairs (X,Y) of distinct X,Y
from V.
Initialize: E = {(X, Y )}, Vc = {X, Y }, Vu = V − {X, Y }
B) repeat
Find variables P,Q from V maximizing the function DEPBN(P,R) for all pairs (P,R)
with P ∈ Vc, R ∈ Vu.
Substitute: E = E ∪ {(P,R)}, Vc = Vc ∪ {R}, Vu = Vu − {R}.
until Vu is an empty set.
C) Pick one of variables from V and orient all the edges in E away from this variable.
To demonstrate the validity of this general theorem, its specialization was implemented for
the Dempster-Shafer belief networks. The following δ function was used: Let Bel1 be a DS
belief function and Bel2 be a DS pseudo-belief function approximating it. Let
δ(Bel2, Bel1) =
∑
A;m1(A)>0
m1(A) · | ln
Q1(A)
Q2(A)
|
where the assumption is made that natural logarithm of a non-positive number is plus infinity.
|.| is the absolute value operator. The values of δ in variable Bel2 with parameter Bel1
range:[0,+∞).For randomly generated tree-like DS belief distributions, if we were working
directly with these distributions, as expected, the algorithm yielded perfect decomposition
into the original tree. For random samples generated from such distributions, the structure
was recovered properly for reasonable sample sizes (200 for up to 8 variables). Recovery
of the joint distribution was not too perfect, as the space of possible value combination is
tremendous and probably quite large sample sizes would be necessary. It is worth mentioning,
that even with some departures from truly tree structure a distribution could be obtained
which reasonable approximated the original one.
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6 Recovery of Polytree-structured Belief Networks
A well known algorithm for recovery of polytree from data for probability distributions is
that of Pearl [26], [31], we refrain from describing it here. To accommodate it for usage with
DS belief distributions we had to change the dependence criterion of two variables given a
third one.
Criterion(X1 → X3, X2 → X3) = δ(BEL
↓X1×X2[X3], BEL↓X1×X2))−
−α · δ(BEL↓X1 ⊙ BEL↓X2 , BEL↓X1×X2)
If the above function Criterion is negative, we assume head-to-head meeting of edges X1, X3
and X2, X3. The rest of the algorithm runs as that of Pearl.
The general algorithm would be of the form:
A) E be the set of unoriented edges, V be the set of all (at least 3) variables, Vc be the
set of connected variables, Vu be the set of not connected variables. Find the variables
X,Y from V maximizing the function DEPBN(X, Y ) for all pairs (X,Y) of distinct X,Y
from V.
Initialize: E = {(X, Y )}, Vc = {X, Y }, Vu = V − {X, Y }
B) repeat
Find variables P,Q from V maximizing the function DEPBN(P,R) for all pairs (P,R)
with P ∈ Vc, R ∈ Vu.
Substitute: E = E ∪ {(P,R)}, Vc = Vc ∪ {R}, Vu = Vu − {R}.
until Vu is an empty set.
C) For every pair of edges((X,Z),(Y,Z)) from E sharing an edge end calculate Criterion(X →
Z, Y → Z). (head-to-head) If the result is negative, orient both edges as (X → Z),
(Y → Z), otherwise do nothing for them.
D) Orient remaining unoriented edges as not to cause new head-to-head meetings.
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The steps C) and D) may result in conflicts concerning edge orientations if the true underlying
joint belief distribution was not poly-tree shaped. Special heuristic procedures need to be
applied to resolve them reasonably (In the actual implementation both steps are in fact
intermixed).
For randomly generated polytree-like DS belief distributions, if we were working directly
with these distributions, as expected, the algorithm yielded perfect decomposition into the
original polytree. For random samples generated from such distributions, the structure was
recovered properly only for very large sample sizes (5000 for 6 variables), with growing
sample sizes leading to spurious indications of head-to-head meetings not present in the
original distribution. Recovery of the joint distribution was also not too perfect, due to
immense size of space of possible value combinations.
7 Recovery of General Type Belief Networks
Hidden (latent) variables are source of trouble both for identification of causal relationships
(well-known confounding effects) and for construction of a belief network (ill-recognized di-
rection of causal influence may lead to assumption of independence of variables not present
in the real distribution). Hence much research has been devoted to construction of models
with hidden variables. It is a trivial task to construct a belief network with hidden vari-
ables correctly reflecting the measured joint distribution. One can consider a single hidden
variable upon which all the measurables depend on. But such a model would neither meet
the requirements put on belief network (space saving representation of distribution, efficient
computation of marginals and conditionals) nor those for causal networks (prediction capa-
bility under control of some variables). Therefore, criteria like minimal latent model (IC
algorithm [28]) or maximally informative partially oriented path graph (CI algorithm and
its accelerator FCI algorithm [42]) have been proposed. As the IC algorithm for learning
minimal latent model [28] is known to be wrong [42], and a failure of FCI has also been
reported [22], let us consider the CI algorithm from [42].
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In [42] the concept of including path graph is introduced and studied. Given a directed
acyclic graph G with the set of hidden nodes Vh and visible nodes Vs representing a causal
network CN, an including path between nodes A and B belonging to Vs is a path in the
graph G such that the only visible nodes (except for A and B) on the path are those where
edges of the path meet head-to-head and there exists a directed path in G from such a node
to either A or B. An including path graph for G is such a graph over Vs in which if nodes
A and B are connected by an including path in G ingoing into A and B, then A and B
are connected by a bidirectional edge A < − > B. Otherwise if they are connected by an
including path in G outgoing from A and ingoing into B then A and B are connected by
an unidirectional edge A− > B. As the set Vh is generally unknown, the including path
graph (IPG) for G is the best we can ever know about G. However, given an empirical
distribution (a sample), though we may be able to detect presence/absence of edges from
IPG, we may fail to decide uniquely orientation of all edges in IPG. Therefore, the concept
of a partial including path graph was considered in [42]. A partially oriented including
path graph contains the following types of edges unidirectional: A− > B, bidirectional
A < − > B, partially oriented Ao− > B and non-oriented Ao − oB, as well as some local
constraint information A ∗ −∗B∗ − ∗Cmeaning that edges between A and B and between B
and C cannot meet head to head at B. (Subsequently an asterisk (*) means any orientation
of an edge end: e.g. A ∗ − > B means either A− > B or Ao− > B or A < − > B).
A partial including path graph (PIPG) would be maximally informative if all definite edge
orientations in it (e.g. A−∗B or A < −∗B at A) would be shared by all candidate IPG for
the given sample and vice versa (shared definite orientations in candidate IPG also present
in maximally informative PIPG), the same should hold for local constraints. Recovery of
the maximally informative PIPG is considered in [42] as too ambitious and a less ambitious
algorithm CI has been developed therein producing a PIPG where only a subset of edge end
orientations of the maximally informative PIPG are recovered. Authors of CI claim such an
output to be still useful when considering direct and indirect causal influence among visible
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variables as well as some prediction tasks.
However, CI algorithm is known to be of high computational complexity even for prob-
abilistic variables. Therefore, we developed a modified version of it [21], [20] to reduce its
complexity and to provide a bridge towards application for DS empirical distributions.
We cite below some useful definitions from [42] and then present our Fr(k)CI algorithm.
In a partially oriented including path graph pi:
(i) A is a parent of B if and only if edge A− > B is in pi.
(ii) B is a collider along the path < A,B,C > if and only if A ∗ − > B < − ∗ C in pi.
(iii) An edge between B and A is into A iff A < − ∗B is in pi
(iv) An edge between B and A is out of A iff A− > B is in pi.
(v) In a partially oriented including path graph pi, U is a definite discriminating path for B
if and only if U is an undirected path between X and Y containing B, B 6= X,B 6= Y ,
every vertex on U except for B and the endpoints is a collider or a definite non-collider
on U and:
(a) if V and V” are adjacent on U, and V” is between V and B on U, then V ∗− > V ”
on U,
(b) if V is between X and B on U and V is a collider on U, then V− > Y in pi, else
V < − ∗ Y on pi
(c) if V is between Y and B on U and V is a collider on U, then V− > X in pi, else
V < − ∗X on pi
(d) X and Y are not adjacent in pi.
(e) Directed path U: from X to Y: if V is adjacent to X on U then X− > V in pi, if V
is adjacent to Y on V, then V− > Y , if V and V” are adjacent on U and V is between
X and V” on U, then V− > V ” in pi.
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Let us introduce some notions specific for Fr(k)CI:
(i) A is r(k)-separated from B given set S (card(S) ≤ k) iff A and B are conditionally
independent given S
(ii) In a partially oriented including path graph pi, a node A is called legally removable iff
there exists no local constraint information B ∗−∗A∗−∗C for any nodes B and C and
there exists no edge of the form A ∗ − > B for any node B.
The Fast Restricted-to-k-Variables Causal Inference Algorithm (Fr(k)CI):
Input: Empirical joint probability distribution
Output: Belief network.
A) Form the complete undirected graph Q on the vertex set V.
B’) for j=0 step 1 to k
do if A and B are r(k)-separated given any subset S of neighbours of A or of B,
card(S)=j, remove the edge between A and B, and record S in Sepset(A,B) and
Sepset(B,A).
B”) if A and B are r(k)-separated given any subset S of V (card(S) > 0), remove the edge
between A and B, and record S in Sepset(A,B) and Sepset(B,A).
C) Let F be the graph resulting from step B). Orient each edge as o − o (unoriented at
both ends). For each triple of vertices A,B,C such that the pair A,B and the pair B,C
are each adjacent in F, but the pair A,C are not adjacent in F, orient A*-*B*-*C as
A ∗ − > B < − ∗ C if and only if B is not in Sepset(A,C), and orient A*-*B*-*C as
A ∗ −∗B∗ − ∗C if and only if B is in Sepset(A,C).
D) Repeat
(D1) if there is a directed path from A to B, and an edge A*-*B, orient A*-*B as
A ∗ − > B,
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(D2) else if B is a collider along < A,B,C > in pi, B is adjacent to D, A and C
are not adjacent, and there exists local constraint A ∗ −∗D∗ − ∗C, then orient
B ∗ − ∗D as B < − ∗D ,
(D4) else if P ∗ −> M∗ − ∗R then orient as P ∗ − > M− > R.
(D3) else if U is a definite discriminating path between A and B for M in pi and P
and R are adjacent to M on U, and P-M-R is a triangle, then
if M is in Sepset(A,B) then M is marked as non-collider on subpath P ∗−∗M∗−R
else P ∗ − ∗ AM ∗ − ∗R is oriented as P ∗ − > M < − ∗R,
until no more edges can be oriented.
E) Orient every edge Ao− > B as A− > B.
F) Copy the partially oriented including path graph pi onto pi′.
Repeat:
In pi′ identify a legally removable node A. Remove it from pi′ together with every
edge A ∗ − ∗ B and every constraint with A involved in it. Whenever an edge
Ao− oB is removed from pi′, orient edge Ao− oB in pi as A < −B.
Until no more node is left in pi′.
G) Remove every bidirectional edge A < − > B and insert instead parentless hidden
variable HAB adding edges A < −HAB− > B
End of Fr(k)CI
The algorithm Ci has been first of all moved to DST grounds by using DST independence
tests instead of probabilistic ones.
Steps E) and F) constitute an extension of the original CI algorithm of [42], bridging
the gap between partial including path graph and the belief network (see also [19]).
Conditional belief functions, also in presence of hidden variables are calculated according
to [20].
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Step B) was modified by substituting the term ”d-separation” with ”r(k)-separation”
[21]. This means that not all possible subsets S of the set of all nodes V (with card(S)
up to card(V)-2) are tested on rendering nodes A and B independent, but only those with
cardinality 0,1,2,...,k. If one takes into account that higher order conditional independencies
require larger amounts of data to remain stable, superior stability of this step in Fr(k)CI
becomes obvious. Furthermore, this step was subdivided into two substeps, B’) and B”).
The first substep corresponds to technique used by FCI - restriting candidate sets of potential
d-separators to the so far established neighbourhood. This substep is followed by the full
search over all nodes of V - but only for edges left by B’ - this is in contrast to FCI which
omits step B) of the original CI, and thus runs into the troubles described in [22].
Step D2) has been modified in that the term ”not d-connected” of CI was substituted by
reference to local constraints. In this way results of step B) are exploited more thoroughly
and in step D) no more reference is made to original body of data (which clearly accelerates
the algorithm). This modification is legitimate since all the other cases covered by the
concept of ”not d-connected” of CI would have resulted in orientation of D ∗− > B already
in step C). Hence the generality of step D2) of the original CI algorithm is not needed here.
Steps D3) and D4) were interchanged as the step D3) of CI is quite time consuming and
should be postponed until no alternative substep can do anything.
8 Discussion
The particular feature of the presented algorithms for identification of belief structure in
DST is the close relationship between target knowledge representation scheme, the reasoning
scheme and the data viewing scheme. This unity enabled to adopt some probabilistic belief
network recovery algorithms for purposes of DS belief network recovery from data. If, for
example, no frequentist interpretation for DST existed (as required by Smets [41]), then the
last algorithm (Fr(k)CI) would be pointless, as it relies on statistical tests over a sample.
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Furthermore, if the reasoning scheme would not be that of Shenoy-Shafer [38], then clearly
tree-generation and polytree generation algorithms would make little sense as the knowledge
representation scheme might require more general belief functions than that utilized by
Shenoy and Shafer. It may prove also pointless to represent a joint belief distribution as
a belief network as local influences among variables may lose any meaning (being replaced
by some global fixpoint state of all variables). One should also notice that the possibility
of utilization of statistical independence test for simplification of a joint belief distribution
(decomposition of it) is bound to separate measurability of attributes. But this separate
measurability is obvious for Shenoy-Shafer uncertainty propagation scheme, but does not
need to be so for other.
On the other hand, the notion of statistical independence is strongly related with the
interpretational attitude of the researcher. E.g. if we consider DST as calculus over lower
and upper probability bounds, as done e.g. in [14], then not only the reasoning scheme
would have to be changed (is indicated in [14]) but also the understanding of independence
of variables: instead of missing mutual influence the possibility of missing mutual influence
would have to be considered. The application of Chow/Liu algorithm [3] would then be
connected with notion of lower and upper entropy etc.
Some researchers do not even bother if their notion of independence has at all a empirical
sense. E.g. Hummel and Landy [16] talk about ”independent opinions of experts” within
their probabilistic interpretation. But how such an independence has to be understood ?
Opinions of experts on a subject cannot be independent as they have a common cause - the
subject for which these opinions are issued. Should opinions of experts be really independent,
then at least one of the opinions would have to be unrelated to the subject of expertise, hence
devoid of any useful content. Another strange approach is exhibited in a recent paper by
Zhu and Lee [45] where it is a priori assumed that premise and conclusion of an expert rule
are statistically independent. Under these circumstances the value of a reasoning rule and
hence of the whole reasoning system is questionable (we can infer a posteriori beliefs without
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knowledge of observables).
One of the few interpretations of belief functions possessing intrinsic physical relevance
is the rough set based interpretation presented by Skowron [39] and Grzyma la-Busse [13].
This rough set approach explains a possible physical source of Dempster-Shafer uncertainty
(incomplete observable set for decision table). However, it couldn’t be used in combination
with our algorithms as it does not fit the separate measurability requirement (enforcing
separate measurability would cause loss of information otherwise present in decision table).
Rough set approach allows also for more precise representation of conditional relationships
between decision variables than that actually imposed by Shafer’s conditioning. Therefore
Shenoy-Shafer uncertainty propagation scheme is also not suitable for application within the
rough set framework as it would deteriorate decision table capabilities.
The algorithms developed constitute in some sense extensions of known algorithms from
the bayesian belief network literature. However, these extensions were not straightforward
ones. First of all the empirical meaning of independence and conditional independence from
data for DS theory had to be established. This required imposition of a compatible probabilis-
tic interpretation of DST. However, as just stated, no such completely useful interpretation
was available from literature. Hence one had to be developed. As the tree-recovery algorithm
is concerned, the general famework of Chow/Liu algorithm [3] could be adopted with the
exception of distance measure. This measure had to be invented completely from scratch as
the intuition behind Chow/Liu original measure is that of probabilistic composition which
has properties contrary to DS composition (compare the effects of decompositions). Simi-
larly conditional distance had to be designed anew for polytree-recovery algorithm of Pearl
[31].
In case of general network with variable hiding the adaptation of CI algorithm Spirtes et al.
[42] involved more complex work. As stated already, the notion of conditional independence
from data for DST had to be invented. Furthermore, a result in form of a belief network
instead of CI’s partial including path graph was required [19] and later adopted for DST
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[20]. But the time complexity of CI was already high for probabilistic networks and ex-
plodes for DS networks. Therefore some simplifications and algorithmic improvements had
to be carried out (compare [21]). Last not least, some heuristics for calculation of marginal
and conditional distributions from data for and in presence of hidden variables had to be
elaborated (This task was not reported here).
9 Conclusions
Within this paper belief network discovery algorithms for three different classes of Dempster-
Shafer belief networks (tree-structured, poly-tree-structured, general ones with variable hid-
ing) have been presented. Close relationship between utility of these algorithms and the usage
of a particular uncertainty propagation scheme (Shenoy-Shafer local computation method
[38]) has been demonstrated. Also a new frequentist interpretation of DST has been de-
scribed and shown to be a prerequisite for application of developed algorithms.Though in
basic ideas these algorithms resemble ones known from bayesian network literature, consid-
erable effort was required for clearing various details, like measures of distances between
variables, instantiating of causal networks to belief networks etc.
It is hoped that this research may contribute to adaptation of further bayesian network
recovery algorithms for DS belief networks and/or outline procedures for development of
complex probabilistic models for other known uncertainty propagation schemes of DST.
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